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Risk Perception and Altruistic Averting Behavior: Removing 
Arsenic in Drinking Water 
Yongxia Cai, W. Douglass Shaw, and Ximing Wu
1 
In this paper we use elicited subjective mortality risks of arsenic in conjunction with sample data 
on drinking water treatment expenditures to model household averting behavior that may involve 
motives to protect children. We use a data set for households within selected arsenic hot spots in 
the United States. To our knowledge, so far, while arsenic has been studied in other countries, 
few data sets within the U.S. exist that allow a detailed examination of preferences and 
subjective risks relating to arsenic contamination. A key element of the research here involves 
exploration of possible altruistic behavior, in protecting children from arsenic risks. 
When consumed over a long period of time, arsenic has been shown to increase the risks 
of bladder and lung cancer at levels of 50 parts per billion (ppb) and above (Smith et al. 1992; 
Smith et al. 2002). Arsenic may have several other health effects such as skin cancer, but we 
focus on the major ones here. Baseline risk of dying from lung or bladder cancer for the average 
person in the United States is approximately 60 per 100,000 people. The risk of getting lung or 
bladder cancer from drinking water with 50 ppb levels for a period of about 15 to 20 years for a 
similar U.S. population is estimated to be about 1000 out of 100,000 people. The latency period 
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we assume to relate to this modeling is communicated to people in the sample to be about 20 
years.
2  
Average arsenic-related risks increase to approximately 2000 out of 100,000 people, for a 
smoker, who already faces a heightened risk of getting and dying from lung cancer. While there 
is no reliable data to confirm this, the National Research Council (NRC) agreed that because of 
the larger amount of water consumed per pound of body weight, children may be exposed to an 
even greater mortality risk for the arsenic in the drinking water (National Research Council, 
2001). Most scientists agree that at the very least, children will have a shorter time between the 
initial ingestion of arsenic and the incidence of possible diseases than adults will face.  
Correspondingly, the U.S. federal regulatory standards for arsenic in drinking water 
(relating to the Safe Drinking Water Act) were tightened from 50 ppb to 10 ppb since January 
2001, with compliance to be achieved by January 2006. Because of the lack of precise objective 
assessments of mortality risks and uncertainty relating to exposures, this standard is controversial. 
Some scientists believe that the 10 ppb is too low and that the economic cost of meeting the 
existing rule is therefore too high. Other scientists believe that 10 ppb is not low enough to 
reduce the risks to safe levels for drinking water. According to Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the annual economic cost is $205.6 million, while monetized bladder and lung cancer 
health benefits range from $139.6 million to $197.7 million (EPA, 2000). In addition, there are a 
large number of other important health-related benefits associated with arsenic reduction, which 
cannot be monetized.  
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Because of these uncertainties in the known science, it is important to incorporate 
perceived risks into our modeling of drinking water treatment. We develop a simple risk model 
to examine household respondents’ perceived mortality risk for both themselves and one of their 
children, if any are present in the household. Next, we investigate whether the household 
respondent will take his or her perceived risks into consideration while deciding whether to 
effectively treat their water to reduce mortality risks. The averting behavior model allows 
examination of whether households with children will exhibit more averting behavior activities, 
and possibly have greater averting expenditures than households without children. We estimate 
the risk equations first, and then use predicted values from that in a two-stage Heckman model of 
observed water treatment expenditures, conditioned on the decision to treat water. For purpose of 
comparison, we also estimate a simple Tobit model of treatment expenditures. To preview our 
key finding: we do find some evidence of altruistic behavior, in that a variable that relates to the 
parent’s subjective estimate of the child’s risk is positive and significant in the expenditure 
equation. 
The remainder of this manuscript is laid out as follows. First, we provide a basic 
background on or review of the role of subjective or perceived risks and also on averting 
behavior studies that relate to environmental risks. Next, we present theoretical models that lead 
to the estimable models. The survey and the data are described in the next section, along with the 
estimating equations and their specification. The empirical results follow the specification 
descriptions and we offer a short summary and conclusions in the final section. 
Background Literature  
In this section we first review some background literature on the role that subjective or perceived 
risks take in models that involve decisions in the context of risk or uncertainty, and second,   4
review some studies that previously investigate averting behavior. We also review a few key 
studies that examine the presence of altruistic behavior in the context of averting behavior 
models. There has been a very large amount of literature in the fields of economics and 
psychology or decision theory, both old and new, that considers subjective and perceived risks, 
and it is impossible to cover it all, so we try to highlight the most relevant papers to what we do 
in the analysis.
3 
Subjective or Perceived Risks 
Traditionally, economic modeling of behavior that involves risks has relied on risks as specified 
by scientists or so-called experts. However, the designation of experts has itself been called into 
question (see Rowe and Wright 2001), and many believe that an individual’s subjective or 
perceived risks are likely to better explain an individual’s behavior than science-based risks (e.g. 
Slovic 1987). Because of uncertainties about the nature and quantification of arsenic-related 
mortality risks, we think those doubts are warranted here. Models based entirely on expert or 
objective risks will most likely fail to accurately predict drinking water behaviors. First, 
laboratory experiments have often indicated that individuals tend to underestimate high-risk 
events and overestimate small-risk events, and their perceived risks are often strongly different 
from those based on scientific studies (see references in Shaw and Woodward 2008). Previous, 
but recent research on drinking water behavior in the U.S. may suggest that subjective risks or at 
least subjective measures of “safety” related to arsenic (Shaw, Walker and Benson 2005) or other 
contaminants (Poe and Bishop 1999) are likely to be very important. 
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Perceived risks have been explored for natural hazards (e.g. Bernknopf, Brookshire and 
Thayer 1990) and a variety of other events. A person’s reported subjective or perceived risk is 
perhaps formed in a manner consistent with a Bayesian learning process. Whether people update 
risks is an empirical issue, but as suggested in prospective reference theory and elsewhere (see 
Viscusi, 1989), a Bayesian learning framework involves a weighted average of an individual’s 
prior belief of the risks, plus new risk information he has received to update this prior, as well as 
the individual’s measured behavior and past experiences. The existence of a Bayesian learning 
process can be consistent with the finding that individuals tend to underestimate high-risk events 
and overestimate small-risk events, but there is no a priori reason that individuals have to sense 
that risks are lower than experts do (e.g. Viscusi 1990, finds that cigarette smokers over-estimate 
smoking-related risks). Liu and Hsieh (1995), Lundborg and Lindgren (2004) used a Bayesian 
learning process in their estimation of people’s smoking risk perception and found out that both 
smokers and non-smokers overestimated the risks of lung cancer. In their study individuals with 
higher perceived risks were less likely to be smokers but risk beliefs had no effect on the number 
of cigarettes consumed by the smokers. 
Several other environmental topics that have been addressed include radon (Smith and 
Desvousges 1989), the value of safety (McDaniel, Kamet and Fisher 1992), and several key 
contaminants in drinking water. In more closely related work to this paper, Poe and Bishop 
(1999) examine the relationship between a sample member’s ground or well water nitrate level 
and a proxy for risk, which are couched as response categories (e.g. my well water is definitely 
safe, probably not safe, etc.). Other possible explanations of discrepancies between subjective 
and science-based risks usually relate to other types of probability weighting schemes (see Shaw 
and Woodward 2008 for a review).   6
Altruism 
Altruism can be a factor in a parent’s decision to allocate resources for the household. Most 
literature relating to children assume only one decision maker for the household, or at least that 
the child does not make decisions. They fall within two categories: paternalistic or non-
paternalistic altruism. In the former case, parents are assumed to maximize their own utility, but 
this utility function includes the children’s consumption of goods, which are provided by the 
parent. In the latter, the child’s utility becomes an argument of the parent’s utility function.  
The estimation of altruistic effects on decisions that could reduce the health risk is now 
fairly widespread in the literature on purchases of market goods (see as just as few of many 
examples, Dickie and Gerking 2007; Khwaja, Sloan and Chung 2006; Jenkins, Owens and 
Wiggins 2001; Carlin and Sandy 1991; Viscusi, Magat and Forrest 1988). Through the purchase 
of safe products the public reveals its preference and valuation for the reductions in risk and the 
data allow an opportunity for researchers to explore altruistic behavior. The results from Viscusi, 
Magat and Forrest (1988) suggest a parent’s WTP for a child’s risk reduction is 50 percent 
higher than for themselves. 
Carlin and Sandy (1991) examined a mother’s purchase and use of safety car seats, and 
estimated the value of a statistical life (VSL) for children to be $0.75 million. Jenkins, Owens 
and Wiggins (2001) studied the market for bicycle safety helmet and estimated a separate VSL 
for children and adults. Their result is surprising in that the VSL for adults is higher than for 
children. Khwaja, Sloan and Chung (2006), examine the effect of marital status and a spouse’s 
health on one’s own smoking behavior, where the spouses’ health is an argument in an 
individual’s own utility function.    7
Subjective risks might depend on preferences for the welfare of other people, in addition 
to one’s own, and if risks are mitigated or avoided, behavior will be related. Values for risk 
reductions thus might also depend on others’ preferences or at least something about the other 
person, suggesting a form of altruism. The notion that people have preferences and values that 
are related to preferences for the safety of another person is not new, but credibly estimating 
such values, or distinguishing portions of values for one’s own safety, versus someone else’s 
safety, are new efforts. Liu et al. (2000) consider a contingent valuation approach where mothers 
are asked about their own protection against minor illness (a cold), as well as their children’s. 
They find that the maximum WTP to prevent comparable illness is twice as large for the child as 
for the mothers in their sample. Though it is implied, these authors present no formal derivation 
of a model (one that is utility theoretic) that specifically accounts for the child’s welfare within 
the mother’s utility function. 
 A little more recently, Riddel and Shaw (2003) developed and estimated a formal model 
of bequest value that decomposes the total value of a risk reduction into that portion of value 
attributable to one’s own protection against risks, and for others. Specifically, they consider both 
current and future generations’ values to accept risks. The model’s decomposition allows 
recovery of bequest values. 
Even more recently, Dickie and Gerking (2007) test the hypothesis that an altruistic 
parent’s marginal rate of substitution between an environmental health risk to the parent and to 
their child is equal to the ratio of marginal risk reduction costs. Their empirical work, in the 
context of willingness to pay for sun lotions that may reduce the risks of skin cancer (and 
conditional mortality), supports this prediction. Their theoretical model is a standard utility 
maximization framework, where the household production model incorporates altruism of   8
parents toward their young children in the context of latent health risks. This appears to be in 
contrast to the standard risk framework of the expected utility model, but it may be quite 
consistent with it. The authors estimate a marginal WTP that is perhaps somewhat different from 
a welfare measure that would arise from formal derivation via the EUM (i.e. an ex ante WTP 




Averting behavior or self protection is involved when people respond to increased degradation of 
environmental qualities (Smith and Desvousges 1986) or to the presence of environmental or 
health risk that may cause harm. For example, people move or reduce physical activities when 
air pollution becomes intolerable, they apply sunscreen to protect their skins from UV radiation, 
and they buy bottled water if they suspect that water supplies are polluted. Averting behavior or 
self protection is a critical factor in the analysis of public risk mitigation policy. Previous 
theoretical work on averting expenditures has concluded that these expenditures can provide a 
conservative estimate of the true cost of increased degradation of environmental qualities.
6  
When risks exist that can be avoided by taking some averting or self-protecting action, 
then the risks are possibly endogenous to the individual. For example, while the risks from 
drinking water with arsenic levels at 100 parts-per billion are a given, the risks to a household 
with a raw water supply, but which avoids the raw water supply by treating, are not. Shogren and 
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Crocker (1991) point out when self-protection influences either the probability of an given 
adverse outcome, or the severity of health outcomes, or both, the individual’s marginal 
willingness to pay for reduced risk cannot be expressed solely in terms of the marginal rate of 
technical substitution between ambient hazard concentrations and self-protection.
7  
Averting Behavior and Drinking Water 
In the context of drinking water there have been many discussions of averting behaviors such as 
water treatment, or purchases of bottled water, or boiling contaminated water. Most drinking 
water studies (Abdalla, Roach and Epp 1992; Collins and Steinbeck 1993; Laughland et al. 1993; 
Whitehead, Hoban and Van Houtven 1998) do not specifically incorporate a conventional 
measure of risk or more importantly, perceived risks. Estimates of average monthly expenditures 
to avoid contamination range from less than a dollar, to over $100 per month (Collins and 
Steinbeck 1993). Poe and Bishop (1999) examine health issues relating to nitrates in drinking 
water, and while they have estimates of concentrations, they do not use conventional risk 
measures relating to them. Instead they attempt to transform “safety” perceptions about the 
concentrations into a proxy for risk. 
Abrahams, Hubbell, and Jordan (2000) estimate a model of several averting behaviors in 
response to water contamination risks for Georgia residents. Their model examines the choice 
between using bottled water, water filtered from the tap, and unfiltered tap water. Non-health 
related water quality effects (taste, odor, and appearance) are incorporated into the model to 
account for the joint production of utility and health. Their results indicate that the perceived 
health risks from tap water, the individual’s concerns about taste, odor, and appearance of tap 
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water, and the individual’s race and age are the important determinants of bottled water selection. 
Information regarding current or prior problems with tap water, perceived risks from drinking tap 
water, and income are the most important determinants of the water filter option. When quality 
differences between bottled water and filtered water versus tap water are adjusted for, the authors 
think that averting cost estimates using bottled water expenditures lead to an overstatement of 
avoidance costs by about 12%. They conclude that averting costs for filtration represent the true 
cost of averting expenditures.  
In a similar study to the one in the current paper, Shaw, Walker and Benson (2005) also 
model the decision to treat water in the presence of arsenic. However, they actually use the 
estimated probability of treatment as a proxy for risk, as they have no information on the sample 
respondent’s sense of risk. In summary, though there have been several averting behavior studies 
relating to water quality, in most of these research studies, the authors fail to quantify the 
perceived risks. In the next section we lay out a risk model that allows determination of the 
factors that explain subjective risks, and then link these to a model of water treatment. 
The Theoretical Models  
In this section we first provide a brief model of risk perceptions, and second, lay out a utility-
theoretic water treatment decision model that is linked to the risk model. 
Modeling Risk Perceptions 
As in a Bayesian learning process about risks proposed in many other studies, the individuals in 
our sample (described below) might be assumed to have three sources of information that relate 
to their own risks, as well as to their perceived risks for their children, if children are present in 
the household. As noted in the introduction, young children may at higher risks from arsenic   11
exposure in the drinking water because of higher arsenic/weight ratios, though to our knowledge, 
this has not been conclusively demonstrated scientifically for obvious reasons. These three 
sources are the individual’s prior sense of arsenic risks (P), the information (Q) they receive to 
update their risks (here, the information that we give them via a mailed information brochure) 
and the individual’s information that relates to behaviors and experiences, as well as his or her 
personal characteristics, deemed (R). With different weights on each term, this can be written as: 
(1)        R Q P 3 2 1 w w w p + + =  
where the weights 1 w ,  2 w  and  3 w capture the individual’s evaluation of the relative importance of 
each source of risk. It is quite possible that everyone weights the information differently from 
others, so the weights may be individual-specific. 
Like most researchers, we have no information regarding the individual’s prior sense of 
risks. We did not ask individuals in the survey sample their prior in advance of giving them 
information, though for some people, they may not update their prior much based on information 
they received during the survey process. Viscusi and other risk researchers (e.g. Liu and Hsieh 
1995) frequently attempt to model elicited subjective risks using data on these sources of 
information, but like us, most often do not have knowledge of the individual’s prior. In those 
cases the authors assume that a constant term in the estimation of a model of subjective risks 
captures the individual’s prior risks. 
We discuss the risk information communicated to the individuals in more detail below, 
but this information is basically our presentation of what scientists believe to be true about 
mortality risks for average people in the population. The presentation is in an information 
brochure sent to sample households. Since everyone in the sample receives the same information,   12
presuming that they did read the brochure, then there is no variation across individuals and so 
this new information may influence their prior (via the constant term), but each individual might 
weight this information differently. 
We also told respondents that risks do likely vary across individuals, for a variety of 
important possible reasons. In keeping with this is the third source of information (R in equation 
(1)). As examples, an individual’s age, gender, education, race, smoke, baseline health status and 
family health history, may affect her perception of risks. Several studies have found that men 
tend to judge risks to be smaller than women (Slovic 1999). A person who smokes may form 
higher risk perceptions based on knowledge of the observed health effects of her smoking. 
Individuals in poor health may believe they face higher mortality risks than others do, because 
they are more vulnerable than healthy people. 
Finally, some individuals care more about drinking water quality and safety and spend 
money on water treatment or purchasing bottled water than others do. These attitudes and 
behaviors will obviously affect the individual’s arsenic risk perception: a household that already 
treats their water to effectively eliminate arsenic risks should report very low or no mortality 
risks from arsenic, at a water source after treatment. The third source of information we consider 
consists of individuals’ attitudes and behavior, which will be related to water treatment decisions 
and expenditures. This is a good reason why a household’s water treatment decision or 
expenditure becomes an endogenous variable in forming perceived risk. 
As noted above, it is possible that an individual will completely discount Q, and will 
behave in a manner so as to negate the importance of R, so what is observed in their reported 
subjective risk is something quite close to their prior, P. Weights will relate to the precision 
about the risk.  As will be seen below, in the survey for this study, after respondents stated their   13
own perceived risk
p p  , they were asked to evaluate and report their youngest child’s arsenic 
risk
c p , so in what follows we will estimate two risk equations like equation (1) based on the 
Bayesian learning process. However, we will not assume them to be identical equations in 
arguments or the set of explanatory variables. Next, we discuss the water treatment equations we 
estimate. 
The Water Treatment Expenditure Function 
In the conventional world of certainty, and with continuous variables of interest, an optimal 
expenditure function (C
*) for the goods consumed can naturally be derived using duality theory. 
It provides the optimal amount of ex-post expenditure, given a level of utility for the individual 
or household. All outcomes are known in the ex-post world.  Many researchers (e.g. Jakus 1994) 
have showed that observed defensive expenditures can, in theory, be expressed as the difference 
between two restricted expenditure functions, each with different utility levels that correspond to 
levels of averting behavior that work to make a person better off. 
Under conditions of risk, we argue, as have several others, that the appropriate 
framework is an ex ante one, i.e. behaviors and values for risk reductions are best examined 
before risky outcomes are known. One ex ante approach then is to consider the probability of 
engaging in averting behavior, and the role played by averting costs in this framework. This is 
the approach taken by Åkerman, Johnson and Bergman (1991) in their study of mitigation 
against radon risks.
8 We take a different approach than theirs, using the planned expenditure 
function. 
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Smith (1987) and Smith and Desvousges (1988) expand the basic derivation of the 
expenditure function under certainty to allow for the presence of risks, leading to the ex ante or 
planned expenditure function, 
* ( ) p C  .
9 Here, the key point is that when a purchase is made, 
outcomes are not known. Expenditures are made to hold expected utility (EU), not certain utility, 
at a given level. For example, in our study household members purchase water treatment, but 
they do not know if they will someday get sick and die from lung or bladder cancer. The 
resulting planned expenditure function will be: 
(2)                          
* ( , ) p C C Y EU =  
We return to discussion of the planned observed expenditure function below. Here, note 
that in (2) since EU involves the all the things that can be used to specify the expected utility 
function, including the probabilities that weight the outcomes, then planned expenditures will 
also involve them. To our knowledge, though Jakus (1994) and others have estimated an 
empirical version of C* based on duality theory, no one has estimated a model of
* ( ) p C . Most 
empirical models of observed expenditures, such as the one Jakus estimates, use the Tobit 
procedure because only those who make an expenditure report positive (non-zero) amounts of 
expenditure. All others in samples report no expenditures. However, underlying the reported or 
no expenditure in our case, is the decision to treat water in the first place.  
 Modeling the Decision to Treat Water 
We assume that if the technical water treatment approach taken successfully removes arsenic 
from water, the objective additional mortality risk related to arsenic will fall to zero. This is true 
                                                                                                                                                             
however, it is not clear how an OP measure relates to the authors’ use of engineering costs, converted to annualized 
values. It is interesting that the study uses revealed preference, not stated preference data. 
9 The idea of an ex ante expenditure function was also developed by Simmons (1984).   15
for many types of water treatment devices, but not for simple water filters, such as the charcoal 
filters on refrigerators. Our respondents are told this fact. Given limited information and data the 
parent’s treatment response to her own risk and her child’s risk may be considered as discrete 
choice decision (treat versus do not treat). Let V
0  be the parent’s indirect expected utility if she 
decides not to treat water. With no treatment the parent perceives that the entire household faces 
arsenic mortality risk from drinking water, but that it could be different for the parent 
p
nt p  and 
child  
c
nt p . Suppose 
0 V   takes the following simple linear form: 
(3)        
0 0
2 1









where Z is a vector of personal attributes such as age, gender, education, and awareness of 
arsenic risk, and 
0 e  are the usual unobservable factors.
10 
Let  
1 V  be the indirect utility if the parent decides to treat water at an exogenous 
treatment cost TC incurred by the household, with expectation that the parent’s perceived 
mortality risk for both herself and the child are reduced. Correspondingly, we let 
1 V  be:  
(4)                   
1 1 1 1
1 2 ( , , ) ( )
p c p c
t t t t V U Y Y TC Z p p a b p b p g e = = - - - + +   
Again, 
1 e  are the usual unobservables. Note that the term, TC, in equation (4) should not be 
confused with observed chosen expenditures on treatment, which are an endogenous variable 
(exogenous price times a chosen quantity of treatment).
11 In (3) and (4) the marginal utility of 
                                                 
10  While the probabilities are typically terms that are expressed as weights “outside” the deterministic utility 
function in theoretical presentations of the EU framework, the resulting conditional indirect expected utility function 
may take such a simple form as in (2), depending on the distribution of the risky outcomes. See Riddel and Shaw 
(2006) for an example derivation, though theirs is not a conventional EU framework. 
11 It appears to us that some authors have confused this in their utility-theoretic model, or at least in their 
presentation of it. However, note that as in the “travel cost” model of recreation demand, where the random utility 
framework is often used, the conditional indirect utility function involves a unit of the good consumed and a “price” 
per unit. In the recreation setting the proxy for the unobserved unit (trip) price is the travel cost. In our setting the   16
risks are assumed to be the same, while the constant marginal utility of income (as it is linear in 
(3) and (4)) and utility from personal attributes are assumed to be different depending on the 
choice to treat.  
Treating water will be the optimal choice if the individual’s conditional expected utility 
of treating, 
1 V , exceeds the conditional expected utility from not treating.  Subtracting (3) from 
equation (4) gives the usual utility difference: 
(5)             
1 0 1 0 1
1




[( ) ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( )





p p c c
nt t nt t
V V Y TC
Z
Y TC Z
a a a b p p
b p p g g e e
a a b p p b p p g e
- = - - + -
+ - + - + -
= - + - + - + +
 
Here, in the last line of (5), we let 
0 1 a a a - = , 
0 1 g g g - =  and
0 1 e e e - = . The first 
term 
1 ( ) Y TC a a -  in (5) is the net utility loss from income because of water treatment. Risk 




nt p p b - indicates the utility gain from a 




nt p p b - represents the net utility gain to 
the parent from the risk reduction for the children. Simply stated, equation (5) implies that the 
individual will decide to treat water if their perceived ex ante net benefits from the risk 
reductions exceed the perceived marginal costs (their income loss from the water treatment costs 
they make). 
The Relationship between Water Treatment Decision and Planned Expenditures 
Obviously the decision to treat water and the planned expenditure function are related. An 
individual who decides not to treat their households’ water also plans to spend nothing on 
                                                                                                                                                             
proxy for the unobserved price per unit of water treatment is the cost of treatment. This may vary across households 
the same way that travel costs vary across individuals who make trips. I.E. the cost of a treatment system may differ 
in different geographical regions, or by type and quality of the treatment system purchased.   17
treatment, while one who decides to treat must spend on it. What we assume is that the treatment 
decision is made in the context of risk. Once that is made, the expenditures are conditional. We 
mentioned that the usual approach in estimating an equation using observed averting 
expenditures assumes that the equation is based on the certainty-based minimization of 
expenditures, subject to holding certain utility constant, but that in estimation, the Tobit equation 
is used in recognition of possible censoring at zero for those who do not treat. By considering the 
expected utility framework above, we can explicitly link the decision to treat in the face of risk 
with observed expenditures. We do this empirically, by using the usual Heckman procedure. 
Observed expenditures for our households are thus conditioned on the decision to treat, which in 
turn depend on their perceived risks.  
The survey, Sample and the Data 
The data used to estimate the models came from a survey conducted during late 2006 and early 
2007 (see Shaw, et al. 2006 for a more complete description). The survey was conducted in 
Albuquerque (New Mexico), Fernley (Nevada), Oklahoma City (Oklahoma), and in two areas 
within Outagamie County (Wisconsin). These targeted areas were chosen because each had 
potential households who are drinking water that may have arsenic levels that exceed the 10 ppb 
standard; they are not meant to represent any household in the United States, rather, the sample 
should be representative of households in areas where the standard is exceeded in drinking water 
supplies. The sample contains both households who get their water from public drinking water 
suppliers, and those on private wells, which are not regulated by the federal government. 
Prior to conducting the full survey, focus groups were conducted to assist in design of the 
survey instrument. During that process researchers learned that drinking water behaviors were 
more complicated than initially thought, and that the focus group respondents were more   18
comfortable with a presentation of risks using a risk ladder than they were with a risk grid, which 
is an alternative risk-communication device. The responses also led to a different final survey 
plan than initially envisioned. Other details about the focus groups and what was learned during 
them are provided in Shaw et al. (2006). 
To implement the final survey, a phone-mail-phone strategy was used. The initial sample 
was randomly recruited by telephone (for existing listings of phone numbers). Those who 
participated in this first call were at first not given much information about the study, and were 
then given a screen survey. During this call we collected information on respondents’ source of 
drinking water, their level of concern for negative health effects from poor air or water quality, 
their concerns related to their drinking water, their tap water use, and several demographic 
variables such as age, income, education, gender, and home ownership. 733 households 
completed the screener survey. At the end of this survey, all screener participants were asked if 
they were willing to participate in a follow-up survey. 565 respondents stated that they would do 
so. By answering questions in the screen survey, the respondent no doubt could discern the topic 
of the study had to do with water quality, and possibly, with arsenic issues in their drinking water. 
Respondents willing to participate in the remainder of the study were sent an information 
brochure by mail, that included general information on arsenic and questions regarding 
respondents’ households’ current and historical health status, uses of tap water, choices of water 
treatment, water treatment expenditure, and perceptions of the health risks from arsenic in their 
drinking water. Though 565 individuals who did the screener survey had stated that they would 
participate, only 353 households actually completed the follow-up survey, yielding an adjusted 
response rate of about 48% of the original 733 who completed the screener survey.   19
This response rate, while somewhat low, is reasonable given the complexity of the topic, 
and the fact that there were two more parts to be involved with. Participating respondents were 
directed in the mail brochure to complete several questions. Most critical for the collection of 
risk-related data was for them to make marks on risk ladders in the brochure to indicate their 
perceived level of mortality risk associated with exposure to arsenic in their tap water, and they 
were told that they would then be contacted for their answers, by telephone.  
The final step in the survey process was the follow-up phone call which followed the 
initial screener phone call within ten days.  The telephone survey allowed for interaction between 
the respondent and the trained telephone interviewer, in that there was confusion regarding the 
assessment of risks, or the respondent had questions about the mailed brochure information. 
During this final phone survey, we obtained the answers to the questions posed in the mailed 
brochure on tap water use, water treatment choice and the reasons for that, arsenic risk 
perceptions, health status, and other information. 
Possible Sample Selection Effects 
Because only 353 of the original 733 respondents actually participated in the complete study, this 
reasons a concern about possible sample selection bias for the final and estimating samples. A 
nice feature of the phone-mail-phone format is that it allows examination of differences between 
the original sample of 733, and only those who cooperated to participate in the complete study. 
The usual thoughts related to survey sample bias fall into two categories. The first is that only 
people with certain demographic characteristics will participate. For example, it is often thought 
that people with higher incomes are busier than people with lower incomes (they have a higher 
opportunity cost of time) and thus opt out of surveys. The second category of concern relates to 
the salience of the topic for participants: only those who are really concerned or interested in the   20
topic will participate, and this group thus likely has a biased set of preferences. We compared 
key demographic characteristics of both the original and final samples, as well as a response to a 
question about the importance of water quality. There are no statistically significant differences 
that can be observed between the two samples. We also ran probit models of both intended and 
actual participation in the study on the full sample of 733 respondents, controlling for all of the 
variables for which we have data from the first phone survey. More results are fully reported 
elsewhere, but there are few variables that are significant in explaining participation.
12 Being 
male and thinking environmental or water quality both have positive and significant effects on 
participating in the final study, but as the above states, there are no important differences in the 
composition of the original and final samples in those dimensions. 
Table 1 shows the variables definitions and their descriptive statistics used in this 
estimating sample for this study. The majority of the variables in this study relate to water 
treatment decisions, but other variables used in modeling are not always available for each 
respondent because of item non-response on the part of some of the members of the final sample 
of 353. The final usable estimating sample is therefore 247 respondents. The respondents 
indicated their arsenic treatment devices if one was obtained, and their annual treatment 
expenditures, and their reasons for treating their water. On average, the 353 respondents reported 
spending $55 per year on water treatment, which is comparable with the available information on 
replacement of filters in reverse osmosis systems capable of removing arsenic. However, two 
respondents with treatment expenditure $1000 and $3648 are excluded from the estimation 
                                                 
12 Tables of these results are available upon request of the authors.  The probit model on the full sample correctly 
predicts 55% of participation decisions, slightly better than the 50% percent of random predication. The Brier score 
for the estimated probit model, which is a recommended alternative measure of fit, was .247, quite close to the score 
(0.25) that indicates a forecast of a binary event at 50/50 (see Jin and Bessler 2008). These results indicate little self 
selection (conditional on observables) in people’s participation decision in our sample.   21
because these high amounts were thought to be outliers. These were probably capital-related 
expenses, while other amounts were typically maintenance-related. For the estimating sample of 
247 in Table 1, average expenditures are a little less than the overall sample. 
All respondents who participated in the final study were asked about their arsenic 
mortality risk perception for their drinking water. This risk perception is likely to be a post-
treatment risk if they treat water. Depending on the treatment devise they used, the respondent 
already knew, or learned from our information brochure how effective the treatment devises are 
in removing arsenic. If people don’t treat their water, then their initial (before treatment) 
perceived risk will be unchanged. Table 2 shows the participants’ (used in the estimating sample) 
mean risk perceptions for themselves and their children, sub-grouped by treatment decision and 
if children are present in the family. The respondents’ mean risk perception for themselves for 
the full estimating sample is 0.00556. Some households indicate risks as high as 0.04, but 86% of 
the overall sample indicates that their mortality risks are below than 0.01. Recall that the science-
based estimate is about 0.01 for the U.S. population at large, and for levels of arsenic of about 50 
ppb. 
It appears that most of the respondents in the estimating sample understood the 
information presented in the risk ladder and other risk information in the mailed brochure. 
However, on average, the risk perception for respondents with children is significantly higher 
than the perceived risk for respondents without children. Parents indicate that their water 
treatment efforts will reduce at least some of risks they face. However, if we only compare the 
non-parent respondents to the parents, the average perceived risk for those who treat water is 
actually higher than those who don’t treat water.     22
Table 2 also shows that the average parent’s subjective risk for their children is very 
close to the mean risk for themselves, suggesting that the parent’s own risk beliefs will play an 
important role in formulating the children’s risk. The information brochure does suggest that 
children might face a different risk than adults, but the science couches that in terms of a shorter 
time until disease can manifest itself rather than as a higher point estimate of risk. Next, an 
econometric model is used to examine the relationship between the own and children’s risk 
perceptions. 
Empirical models/Specification 
We have described three equations that will be estimated and linked together for the analysis: (1) 
respondents’ risk perception for themselves; (2) the respondents’ risk perception for the youngest 
child if they have one; (3) and finally, a treatment expenditure decision that will be a function of 
estimated risks.   
We first estimate the perceived risk of those households who did not treat their water, 
treating this group as the baseline group.  We then use estimated parameters from the baseline 
group to predict the counterfactual pre-treatment risk for those households that treated their 
water.  The difference between the second groups’ perceived risk (after treatment) and predicted 
risk (before treatment) captures the expected risk reduction for those who treated their water.  
The expected risk reduction for the children is estimated similarly.  We then estimate household 
treatment decisions based on their observed characteristics and expected risk reductions for the 
adults and for the children (if present).  Finally, we estimate household treatment expenditure as 
a function of household characteristics and expected risk reductions.  The censored nature of the 
treatment expenditure is accounted for by using the Tobit or Heckman two step method.  The 
results from these two approaches are quantitatively very similar.   23
Risk perceptions for the participants   
Theoretically, the decision to treat likely influences the stated risks from each respondent, but 
this decision is also an endogenous choice variable that has been shown to depend on factors 
such as income and the price of treatment devices (see Shaw, Walker and Benson, 2005).  To 
avoid the difficulties that would arise in finding valid instrumental variables for modeling 
endogenous treatment, we separate the sample into two groups: those who treat water are in the 
first group (j=t), and those who don’t report treating their water (j=nt) in the second. We use the 
risk equation for the nt group to forecast the before-treatment risk for everyone in the sample. 
We then examine the difference between this predicted before-treatment risk for those who treat, 
and their stated risk. When the stated risks are lower for this group we interpret this as the risk 
reduction they perceived due to treatment. Since the nt group doesn’t treat their water, the risk 
difference or reduction is assigned to be 0. In other words, the expected risk reductions for an 
individual will be: 
(6)          
ˆ          if j t (treat)





￿ - = ￿ = ￿
= ￿ ￿
 
  In the survey, the respondents can give either point estimate of his risk if he is sure, or 
an interval if he is not very uncertain about a point estimate for his or her household. For the 
second case, the mid-point of the stated interval is used.
13 As described in our conceptual 
framework, risk perceptions can, in theory, be expressed as a weighted average of three sources 
of information. The individual’s prior sense of risk is assumed to be captured in a constant term 
that is estimated for all individuals. Gender, education, age, smoking status, number of children 
                                                 
13 In contrast, some researchers estimate an interval model that can then be used to predict risks for both those who 
state a point estimate, and those who provide an interval.   24
in the family, health status of own and other family members, the respondent’s job increases the 
risks of getting bladder cancer (some occupations do), and his or her safety perception about 
drinking water are included as variables in the model of perceived subjective risks.   
   Since the subjective risk is bounded between 0 and 1, the log odds transformation for 
subjective risk was regressed on the explanatory variables using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) 
to model the respondents’ perceived risk for themselves and their children, when present, for a 
second subsample that household’s water is not treated. This approach has one advantage over 
other possible modeling approaches, which is to ensure that the predicted subjective risk remain 
within the range of 0 and 1
14. In addition, we recognize that in the risk modeling itself, sub-
samples may self-select to treat their water or not to treat water, so a Heckman two-step method 
was also conducted here to account for the possible selection (those who self-select into water 
treatment) bias in the cost model. The coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio was not statistically 
significant, suggesting little sample selection bias so a simple log odds transformation is viewed 
to be appropriate.    
Risk perceptions for the children 
In the survey parents also are asked to assess risks for their youngest child. Because the decision 
to treat is an endogenous choice variable, we adopt the same procedure as above, and forecast 
before-treatment risks for the treatment group to be able to extract the difference, arriving at the 
similar equation to (6), for children’s risk reduction. As we can see in Table 2, the respondent’s 
risk perception for herself is very close to the subjective risk perception for her child. We 
hypothesize that there are some unobserved variables that may influence both the parent’s risk 
                                                 
14 Alternatively, some use the beta distribution to model reported probabilities, but this distribution is often unwieldy 
in estimation.   25
perception for herself and her child. Therefore, the parent’s own perceived risk is included as an 
explanatory variable in the model to proxy these unobserved factors.   
Treatment Decision/Expenditure decision 
We assume that the treatment decision may depend on the type of water system the household is 
on (public or private), their gender, and whether they say they are using their tap water for all of 
their water needs. The treatment equation, as well as the expenditure function, is also a function 
of expected own and children’s risk reductions. Our test of behavior consistent with altruism 
depends on whether and which of the risk difference coefficients are significant. If only the 
parent’s own risk is significant, then the household member makes decisions solely based on 
those risk reductions and does not seem to be concerned about the children. Otherwise, they care 
about the child, or both. 
We also implicitly map from the utility function to the expenditure function, including 
variables that may affect expected utility such as education, whether the respondent owns their 
home, and whether the respondent is a current smoker. We also include two variables 
representing attitudes towards arsenic risk (Arsenicnfor: whether they had much arsenic 
information prior to our survey, and Safety: their strength of their health concerns about the 
drinking water), and two variables explaining the reasons for treating their water (improve the 
taste and smell). 
Empirical Results 
Own Risk perceptions 
We had no initial thought that subjective risks of arsenic would be higher than the best estimates 
of scientists, which again is about one in one hundred, or 0.01, for the average non-smoker, nor   26
did we think it would necessarily be lower. This is an empirical issue. Table 3 presents the log 
odds transformation model for subjective own and children’s arsenic risks separately. In the own 
risk model, status such as a current smoker, and the number of children in the household have 
positive and significant effects (at 1% or the 5% significance level) on own subjective risk, while 
the coefficient on the variable Safety (a rating of the respondent’s general perceptions of the 
safety of drinking (tap) water) is significant and negative. Education is negative and weakly 
significant (at about the 8% significant level). No other included variables are significantly 
different from zero in the model of the parent’s own risk for this sample. The marginal effects of 
each variable are in the fourth column of Table 3, and these are considered next. 
The effect of Cursmoke (being a current smoker = 1, = 0 otherwise) on stated arsenic-
related risks is interesting, but not should be confused with such estimates in the smoking 
literature because those generally relate specifically to mortality from lung cancer as it relates to 
smoking behaviors. Recall that ingesting arsenic may increase the risks of dying from at least 
two diseases (lung and bladder cancer), though if detected early, bladder cancer may not lead to 
death (see references and more discussion in Shaw et al. 2006). Also recall that the scientist’s 
best estimate of arsenic mortality risks for a non-smoker who consumes water with about 50 ppb 
of arsenic in it for a period of about 15 to 20 years is one in a hundred, or 0.01. The risk ladder 
included in the information brochure not only showed this, but also showed that the risks for a 
smoker are approximately twice this large as for a non-smoker. The marginal effect of the 
dummy variable indicating current smoking is around 0.00554, indicating that smokers 
understood the information from the risk ladder to some extent. An average smoker has a 
perceived arsenic mortality risk that is 0.00554 higher than a non-smoker, ceteris paribus.   27
The number of children in the family carries a positive and significant sign (at 1% 
significance level). For households with one child, as compared to none, the stated or subjective 
risk will increase by around 0.00094. People who state, on the scale of agreement with the 
statement that tap water is safe, that they more strongly agree by one unit, this decreases the 
marginal subjective risk by 0.00134. 
It is often thought that education is important in communicating risks to people, and that 
more educated people better understand information given to them. Our prior on this coefficient 
was that an individual with higher education will obtain more knowledge from public risk 
information (Liu and Hsieh, 1995) and form a reasonable subjective estimate, but in our 
empirical model more education lowers the risk estimate by 0.0014. Finally we note that while 
all of the other variables are statistically insignificant at even the 10% level, most of the signs do 
make sense.  
Subjective Risk perceptions for children 
The subjective risk perception model results for children for the second group are also shown in 
Table 3.  The parent’s predicted own risk (RiskOwn ) plays a dominant and significant role in 
determining the risk perception for the child. The coefficient is significantly greater than unity, 
reflecting the tendency for parents to make higher estimates of risk for their children than they 
made for themselves. Using the predicted risks for the parent captures the influence of other 
variables used in the Riskown model, so it is not surprising that the other variables are not 
significant in this model. Note that if the variable Riskown is omitted in the model, the effect 
from the other variables is significantly different than zero, which of course indicates that 
Riskown has a strong correlation with these variables. Next we turn to discuss the results of 
estimated treatment and averting expenditures.   28
Estimated Treatment and Averting Expenditures 
Table 4 presents the results of our Heckman two step model, where the first step models water 
treatment decision and the second, treatment expenditure conditional on treatment. We present 
three slightly different alternative specifications of the treatment and observed expenditures 
equations (Models 1a, 1b and 1c), and the treatment equation results are in the top half, while the 
cost equation are in the bottom. Model 1a is the most parsimonious specification, and avoids 
overlap in variables used in both equations. Note that for Model 1a only, the mills ratio is 
significantly different from zero. In this simple specification, being a homeowner, having 
information that arsenic is a problem and having and more concerns about arsenic related to 
health positively influence the decision to treat. Being on a public system reduces that tendency. 
The two risk difference variables are each positive, and significantly different from zero in the 
cost equation, suggesting mixed motives for averting behavior. Interesting, the respondents who 
say they use the tap as the source for all their drinking water and cooking needs spend less on 
treatment, though this is weakly significant. 
In all the models in Table 4 being a homeowner is very important in the decision to treat, 
which is not surprising, and households on public water systems are also less likely to treat 
internally than those on private systems. While it may seem obvious that households connected 
to public suppliers are more likely to rely on the public supplier to treat and meet water quality 
standards there is no guarantee that private well users will be willing to bear the added cost and 
decide to treat. The coefficient for the inverse Mills Ratio, which indicates the importance of the 
selection variable (water treatment) is not significantly different from zero for all the other 
specifications (Models 1b and 1c). This is likely because Models 1b and 1c have specifications 
that include several variables with which the mills ratio is correlated.   29
The most important component in the results pertains to whether the two risk reduction 
variables matter in each of the models. If the Diffkid variable is significant in either, this is an 
indication of behavior consistent with altruism. In Models 1b and 1c, note that neither the 
difference in own risk nor in children’s risk is significantly different from zero. However, note 
that in all specifications for the cost model, corrected for possible treatment effects, both 
variables are positive and significant at about the 6 or 7% level, or greater. All the specifications 
support the notion of mixed altruism. 
For purposes of comparison with the two-step Heckman approach, we estimated a Tobit 
model of on the treatment expenditures. The results of three specifications of the Tobit model are 
reported in Table 5 (2a, 2b, and 2c). Here again, both risk differences variables are significant 
and positive, at least at the 10% level (Model 2b). Similar influences from the water system, 
homeowner and arsenic information variable are illustrated in the Tobit specifications. Our 
results are consistent with those of Dickie and Gerking (2007), who fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the marginal rate of substitution of risk reductions between parent and child’s 
risk is equal to one. 
Conclusions 
Protection of young children from environmental hazards has become a worldwide 
priority of government policies set to improve human health. Self protection and altruism in 
families are crucial behavioral factors in determining the effectiveness of these public policies. 
Other researchers have found evidence that parents are willing to protect their children (Dickie 
and Gerking 2007), often resulting in values that are higher for child-protection than for 
themselves (see Liu et al. 2000). In this paper we have developed a two-stage structural model 
within the random utility framework to model the household’s risk averting behavior with   30
respect to arsenic-related mortality risk. We are able to test whether the parent’s sense of risk for 
the child is important in the empirical models. 
Our empirical results suggest that parents engage in a form of mixed altruism.  Parents do 
allocate family income to water treatment to reduce the perceived arsenic mortality risk for both 
the adults in the household and their children. Parents are willing to spend more to make a trade 
off between their risk and their children’s risk. This finding is expected to provide useful 
information for designing effective government polices to improve human health, especially 
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics for Estimating Sample 
Variables  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
RiskOwn  Participant's own subjective risk  0.0056  0.0093 
RiskKid  Participant's perceived risk for her youngest child  0.0025  0.0080 
Female  =1 if female, 0 otherwise  0.40  0.49 
Education  Education level, =1 of college or above, 0 otherwise   0.67  0.47 
Ownage  Participant’s age  51.75  15.28 
Cursmoke  =1 if he is current smoker, 0 otherwise  0.15  0.35 
Dkids  =1 if a participant has at least one child,  0 otherwise  0.36  0.48 
N_Kids  Number of children in the household  0.67  1.04 
Age_K1  The youngest child’s age  2.91  5.07 
Health_K1  The  youngest  child’s  health  status,  range  from  1~5 
with 1= Excellent, 5=Poor 
0.49  0.76 
Healthother  The worst health status of other adult members in the 
household, range from 1~5 with 1= Excellent, 5=Poor 
1.60  2.14 
Healthown  The participant’s own health status, range from 1~5 
with 1= Excellent, 5=Poor 
2.20  0.98 
Homeowner  =1 if the participant owns a  house, 0 otherwise  0.93  0.26 
Wasys  Water supply system, 1=Public, 0=Private  0.67  0.47 
Riskcareer  =1 if the participant’s job is risky, 0 otherwise  0.25  0.43 
Arsenicinfor  =1  if  the  participant  knows  arsenic  problem  in  the 
local water supply, 0 otherwise 
0.61  0.49 
Healconcern  How  concerned  the  health  problem  caused  by 
arsenic  in  the  drinking  water,  range  from  1~5  with 
1=Not at all concerned, 5= Very concerned 
3.31  1.43 
Safety  Whether the tap water is perfectly safe to drink, range 
from 1~5 with 1=Strongly disagree, 5=Strongly agree 
3.17  1.32 
Tap  Do you get all of the water that you use to cook, or 
make coffee, tea, or juice from your tap? =1 if yes, =0 
if no 
0.85  0.35 
Smell  Use a water treatment device to make it smell better, 
1=Mentioned, 0=Not mentioned 
0.03  0.18 
Taste  Use a water treatment device to improve the taste, 
1=Mentioned, 0=Not mentioned 
0.10  0.30 
Income*  Annual household income, $1000  66.34  34.36 
Treat  =1 if water is treated, =0 otherwise  0.44  0.50 
Tcost  Annual water treatment cost, $  36.53  70.21 
Note:  The estimating sample size is 245.  
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Table 2. Risk Perceptions for the Participant’s Self and His/Her Child 
   Treatment Decision  Full Sample 
   Do not treat  Treat   
RiskOwn       
    No children in household       
        Mean  0.00449  0.00474  0.00460 
        StdDev  0.00669  0.00767  0.00711 
        Sample size  89  69  158 
       
    Children in household       
        Mean  0.00781  0.00668  0.00730 
        StdDev  0.01293  0.01125  0.01215 
        Sample size  48  39  87 
       
    Full sample of household       
        Mean  0.00565  0.00544  0.00556 
        StdDev  0.00945  0.00912  0.00929 
        Sample size  137  108  245 
       
RiskKid       
        Mean  0.00749  0.00666  0.00712 
        StdDev  0.01288  0.01147  0.01221 
        Sample size  48  39  87 
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Table 3. Risk Perception Model for Respondents Themselves and Their Children in the 
Control Group 
    Riskown      Riskkid   
  Coef.  P-value  Mar. Effect  Coef.  P-value  Mar. Effect 
_Cons  -5.334   0.000     -5.454   0.000   0.00000  
Riskown        109.454***   0.000   0.36599  
Female  0.007   0.980   0.00003        
Education  -0.343*   0.085   -0.00144        
Ownage  0.005   0.609   0.00002        
Cursmoke  0.975***   0.001   0.00554   -1.234   0.266   -0.00315  
Safety  -0.341***   0.000   -0.00134   -0.021   0.766   -0.00007  
N_Kids  0.239**   0.022   0.00094   -0.136   0.195   -0.00045  
Healthown  0.175   0.154   0.00069        
Healthother  0.101   0.180   0.00040        
Riskcareer  0.053   0.828   0.00021        
Health_k1         -0.169   0.245  -0.00057 
Age_k1        -0.031   0.118  -0.0001 
N    137      39   
Log pseudolikelihood  -3.696      -1.447   
Note:  Asterisk ***, **, and * denote coefficients that are statistically significant al the 1% level, 5% level, and 
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Table 4. Heckman Two Step Model for Averting Behavior in Water Treatment 
  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 1c 
  Coef.  P-value  Coef.  P-value  Coef.  P-value 
Treat             
    Intercept  -1.855***  0.002  -1.897  0.002  -1.353  0.01 
    Income  0.000  0.732  0.001  0.64  0.001  0.727 
    Income*Dkids  0.000  0.899  0.001  0.904  0.000  0.953 
    Diffown      0.009  0.492  0.009  0.464 
    Diffkid      0.023  0.122  0.023  0.135 
    Female      0.208  0.237  0.161  0.356 
    Homeowner  1.021***  0.012  0.961**  0.019  0.948**  0.019 
    Wasys  -0.412**  0.026  -0.419**  0.026  -0.479*  0.012 
    Healconcern  0.113*  0.067  0.102*  0.102  0.082  0.176 
    Arsenicinfor  0.426***  0.013  0.407**  0.02  0.392**  0.025 
    Dkids  -0.115  0.801  -0.188  0.688  -0.153  0.744 
    Tap  0.403  0.110  0.467*  0.072     
    Education          0.052  0.781 
    Cursmoke          -0.122  0.631 
Log likelihood   -154.753    -151.761    -153.249   
Likelihood ratio     26.69  0.001  32.68  0.001  29.70  0.003 
             
Tcost             
    Intercept  182.231***  0.000  32.023  0.757  28.486  0.806 
    Income  -0.301  0.205  -0.385  0.105  -0.429*  0.078 
    Income*Dkids  0.165  0.479  1.100*  0.068  1.080*  0.071 
    Diffown  1.355**  0.054  1.361*  0.067  1.833**  0.026 
    Diffkid  2.262***  0.000  2.315***  0  2.480***  0 
    Homeowner      41.379  0.521  34.432  0.62 
    Healconcern      6.022  0.279  6.852  0.214 
    Arsenicinfor      19.459  0.329  24.922  0.217 
    Dkids      -69.851  0.111  -69.931  0.109 
    Education          5.409  0.74 
    Tap  -0.46.493*  0.097         
    Cursmoke          -35.901  0.133 
    Inverse Mills Ratio  -57.843*  0.076  -6.864  0.869  2.706  0.955 
Rho  -0.659    -0.092    0.037   
Sigma  87.789    74.584    73.559   
Note:  Asterisk ***, **, and * denote coefficients that are statistically significant al the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level respectively. 
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Table 5. Tobit Model for Water Treatment Expenditure 
  Model  2a  Model  2b  Model  2c  Model  2d 
Coef.  P-value  Coef.  P-value  Coef.  P-value  Coef.  P-value 
Intercept  -153.377  0.008  -182.554  0.006  -148.844  0.01  -173.440  0.003 
Income  -0.252  0.381  -0.245  0.394  -0.283  0.333  -0.222  0.44 
Income*Dkids  0.763  0.240  0.775  0.232  0.722  0.266  0.783  0.217 
Diffown  1.967*  0.061  2.005*  0.056  2.265**  0.037  2.603***  0.013 
Diffkid  3.579***  0.000  3.610***  0.000  3.610***  0.000  3.558***  0.000 
Female  16.779  0.336  19.074  0.279  15.142  0.384  22.185  0.196 
Homeowner  110.740**  0.015  110.233**  0.016  106.733**  0.018  102.879**  0.024 
Wasys  -45.099**  0.017  -41.753**  0.029  -44.211**  0.02  -38.767**  0.042 
Healconcern  10.612*  0.082  11.704*  0.060  11.361*  0.064  11.124*  0.064 
Arsenicinfor  47.291***  0.009  47.468***  0.009  47.855***  0.008  42.623**  0.017 
Dkids  -64.882  0.176  -65.984  0.169  -61.159  0.203  -57.736  0.220 
Tap      25.859  0.327        
Education          3.475  0.853  11.027  0.566 
Cursmoke          -26.681  0.306  -31.263  0.228 
Taste              99.057***  0.000 
Smell              85.828**  0.042 
Log likelihood   -710.005    -709.514    -709.438    -698.278   
Likelihood ratio    48.95  0  49.93  0  50.08  0  72.40  0 
Sigma  112.474    112.404    111.796    107.895   
Note:  Asterisk ***, **, and * denote coefficients that are statistically significant al the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level respectively. 
 
 
 